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ABSTRACT
We investigated the extent to which activation of speciﬁc information in associative networks during
a memory task could facilitate subsequent analogical problem solving in healthy older adults as well
as those with early onset Alzheimer’s disease. We also examined whether these priming eﬀects were
stronger when the activation of the critical solution term during the memory task occurred when the
item was actually presented (true memories) or when this item arose due to spreading activation to
a related but nonpresented item (false memory). Older adult controls (OACs) and people with
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) were asked to solve 9 verbal proportional analogies, 3 of which had been
primed by Deese/Roediger-McDermott lists where the critical lure (and problem solution) was
presented as a word in the list (true memory), 3 of which were primed by DRM lists whose critical
lures were spontaneously activated during list presentation (false memory), and 3 of which were
unprimed. As expected, OACs were better (both in terms of speed and accuracy) at solving problems
than people with AD and both groups were better when false memories were primes than when true
memories were primes or there were no primes. There were no reliable diﬀerences between
unprimed and true prime problems. These ﬁndings demonstrate that (a) priming of problem
solutions extends to verbal proportional analogies in OACs and people with AD, (b) false memories
are more eﬀective at priming problem solutions than true memories, and (c) there are clear positive
consequences to the production of false memories.
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Introduction
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) has been described as
a progressive neurodegenerative disorder where learn-
ing and memory performance has been reduced, as
well as rapid forgetting of new information (Malone
et al., 2018). As well as memory loss, patients with AD
also have a higher rate of memory distortions and false
memories, in which patients remember an incorrect
memory that is believed to be true. For example, people
with AD may have thought that they had turned oﬀ
their stove when they simply misremembered that they
turned oﬀ the stove.
The DRM paradigm has become an essential proce-
dure used to study false memories (e.g., Akhtar, Howe,
& Hoepstine, in press; Gilet et al., 2016). Typically, the
memory task consists of a study phase during which
participants are presented with lists of associatively
related words (e.g., vehicle, keys, ford, road) that are
also strongly associated with a critical lure (CL) that is
never presented (i.e., car), followed by a free recall or
recognition task. The typical result is that participants
falsely remember the CL at a rate commensurate with
that for memory for the actually presented items.
In healthy participants, results robustly show a strong
tendency to recall and recognize the CLs falsely, thus
creating false memories (e.g., Akhtar et al., in press;
Balota, Watson, Duchek, & Ferraro, 1999; Deese, 1959;
McDermott, 1996). Research using the DRM paradigm
in healthy older adults regularly shows an increase in
false recall and recognition of CLs relative to healthy
younger adults (e.g., Balota et al., 1999; Dehon &
Brédart, 2004: Dennis, Kim, & Cabeza, 2007; but see
Thomas & Sommers, 2005, for contradictory results).
Several studies have used the DRM paradigm in people
with AD (see Akhtar et al., in press). Whilst some studies
have shown that AD people recall more CLs thus produ-
cing more false memories than healthy older adults (e.g.,
Devitt & Schacter, 2016; Watson, Balota, & Sergent-
Marshall, 2001). Several other studies have found con-
trasting results, thus showing that AD patients produce
or recognize fewer or as many CLs as older healthy
participants (Akhtar et al., in press; Balota et al., 1999;
Budson, Daﬀner, Desikan, & Schacter, 2000; Waldie &
Kwong See, 2003). Although this discrepancy exists in
the literature, in the present study we were not con-
cerned with examining this directly. We are interested
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in whether false memories can be elicited in OACs and
people with AD, and if so whether they can be useful in
a subsequent task (e.g., Akhtar et al., in press) as they are
in children (Howe, Garner, Charlesworth, & Knott,
2011; Howe, Threadgold, Norbury, Garner, & Ball,
2013; Howe, Wilkinson, Garner, & Ball, 2016).
A number of theories have been proposed to explain
how false memories are formed. The activation-
monitoring theory (see Roediger, Watson,
McDermott, & Gallo, 2001) is considered the more
dominant theory (see Gallo 2010 for a review). The
theory proposes false memories are produced because
of two distinct processes; an activation process and
a source-monitoring process. If we consider the DRM
task, because the presentation of each of the lists of
words automatically activates the related but unpre-
sented CL, the CL is activated many times through an
automatic spread of activation within the associative
network. It is this activation that increases the feeling
of familiarity for the item, whilst at the same time
reducing the ability to remember the source of its
activation (source-monitoring process). Thus, accord-
ing to this theory, in order for OACs and people
with AD to form false memories, they must have intact
associative networks.
More generally, false memories have traditionally
been viewed as negative, particularly in aging adults
(e.g., Devitt & Schacter, 2016; Malone et al., 2018).
However, recent research has demonstrated that the
production of false memories need not always have
negative implications (Akhtar et al., in press; Howe,
2011; Howe et al., 2011; Howe, Garner, Dewhurst, &
Ball, 2010; Howe, Threadgold, Wilkinson, Garner, &
Ball, 2017). Akhtar et al. (in press) were the ﬁrst to
carry out research investigating the role that false
memories play in priming insight-based problem sol-
ving using compound remote associate tasks
(CRATs) (see Mednick, 1962) in OACs and people
with AD. CRAT problems, originally developed by
Mednick (1962), involve the presentation of three
words (e.g., pal, tip, and knife) and the task is to
come up with a word (i.e., pen) which, when com-
bined with each of the three original words, creates
compound words or common phrases (i.e., pen pal,
pen tip, pen knife). Akhtar et al. (in press) presented
OACs and people with AD with DRM lists whose
critical lures served as potential primes for half of
the subsequent CRAT problems that participants had
to solve. They found that when participants falsely
remembered the CLs of the studied DRM lists, the
corresponding CRATs were solved more frequently
and signiﬁcantly faster than CRATs that had not
been primed or cases in which DRM lists had been
presented but CLs were not falsely remembered.
Howe et al. (2010, 2011) showed similar ﬁndings in
young adults and children. This research demon-
strates that like true memories, false memories can
successfully prime higher order cognitive tasks (i.e.,
insight-based problem solving).
The aim of the current research was to establish
whether priming with false memories could also be
applied to more complex reasoning tasks that go
beyond “simple” word associations. To this end, we
selected verbal proportional analogies of the type “a is
to b as c is to d” (e.g., ring is to ﬁnger as bracelet is to
wrist). In analogical reasoning tasks, participants are
usually presented with “a is to b as c is to ?” and are
expected to generate the d term. These types of analo-
gies are frequently used in intelligence tests () and
academic examinations such as statutory assessment
tests. Importantly, Howe et al. (2013) showed that
false memories can prime analogical problem solving
in both child and young adult populations (also see
Howe, Garner, Threadgold, & Ball, 2015).
We were also interested in whether true and false
memory priming both enhance the speed and accu-
racy of analogical reasoning in OACs and people
with early onset AD when problem diﬃculty is equa-
ted across groups. We know from Akhtar et al. (in
press) that people with AD produce false memories
that they can subsequently use in a positive way to
help solve insight-based problems. Here, we extend
these ﬁndings in two ways. First, we examined
whether OACs and people with AD have intact asso-
ciative networks that lead to the activation of false
memories that can be used to prime analogical pro-
blem solving. Recent research (e.g., Akhtar et al., in
press; Evrard, Colombel, Gilet, & Corson, 2015; Gilet
et al., 2016; Roediger, Balota, et al., 2001) has shown
both older adults and people with AD do have intact
associative networks that lead to the activation of
false memories. Second, we examined whether
OACs and people with AD can use not only false
memories as primes when solving analogies but also
true (actually presented words) memories as eﬀective
primes when solving analogies.
Experiment 1: Norming verbal analogies
Norms for the relative diﬃculty of various analogical
reasoning problems have been produced using either
children or young adults as participants. In order to
determine the relative diﬃculty of analogical reason-
ing problems for older adults, we ﬁrst had to create
our own age-appropriate norms for older adults. We
did this by having an independent sample of older
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adults solve various analogies and then selected ones
whose baseline solution rates were moderate (30% to
80%; see Appendix) for older adults for use in
our second experiment.
Method
Participants
A total of 45 healthy older adults (10males and 35 females)
took part in this experiment. Theirmean agewas 74.77 (SD
= 5.56). The older adults had normal cognitive functioning
(as assessed by theMiniMental State Examination,MMSE;
Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1974) with a mean score of
28.39 (SD=1.01), normal activities of daily living, andmost
importantly, did not meet diagnostic criteria for dementia.
These older adults were volunteers who were community
dwelling and were tested in their own home or local com-
munity center.
Materials. Older adults were presented with, in rando-
mized order, 20 analogical problems. The format of the
problems was “a is to b as c is to ?” Participants were
instructed to provide one response and had a maximum
time of 60 seconds after which the next analogical pro-
blem appeared on the screen. If participant could not
think of a response, they were instructed to click next.
(Note that only problems with solution rates above 30%
and solved within 30 seconds were selected for subse-
quent use in Experiment 2). All the solution words had
a familiarity rating of 500 or above (with a maximum
entry of 645 and a mean of 566 (Coltheart, 1981)) and
a word frequency of 10 or above (with a maximum entry
of 686 and a mean of 126 (Kučera & Francis, 1967)).
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room.
Instructions similar to those used by Howe et al. (2013)
were given. Speciﬁcally, participants were told that theywill
be presentedwith aword analogy (e.g., hat is to head as sock
is to _____) and are advised to attempt to solve the analogy
(i.e., foot). Participants were ﬁrst given three demonstra-
tions by the experimenter followed by two practice pro-
blems prior to the experiment itself. The analogical
problems were presented on a computer laptop screen
simultaneously in a horizontal orientation. Participants
were given 30s to produce the solution (this was a verbal
solution) and their ﬁrst response was recorded. If the solu-
tion was produced within the time limit, both the solution
word and solution time were recorded and the next pro-
blem was presented. If participants did not produce the
correct response within the time limit, the solution was
provided by the experimenter and the program automati-
cally moved to the next problem.
Results
Table 1 shows the average solution rates and times to the 20
problems separately. As can be seen, older adults were able
to solve most of the analogical problems. Importantly, for
the next experiment, there was a good range of solution
rates and times to the analogical problems. What this
means is that priming eﬀects, should they exist, can be
measured without constraints imposed by ﬂoor and ceiling
eﬀects.
Experiment 2: Examining priming eﬀects in
older healthy adults and those with AD
With these norms in hand, we now turn to the main
questions. That is, can both true and false memories
prime solutions to analogical problems in healthy older
adults and people with AD.
Method
Participants
A new sample of 60 participants was recruited whose
demographic and other characteristics are shown in
Table 2. Thirty participants had a clinical diagnosis of
probable or possible AD (McKhann et al., 1984). Thirty
participants made up an older adult control (OAC)
group. These people were community dwelling and
were recruited from a panel of older adults who had
expressed an interest in participating in research. Nine
participants were excluded from analysis due to Mini-
Mental Status Exam (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh,
1975) scores indicated moderate AD rather than
early AD (<20; Rosa, Deason, Budson & Gutchess,
2014). Six controls were also excluded from analysis
Table 1. Analogical problems: solution rates and times.
Analogy Problem
Analogy
Solution
%
Solved
Solution
Time (s)
Water is to boat as road is to? Car 80.00 3.75 (1.48)
Moon is to night as sun is to? Day 97.14 4.25 (2.32)
Hat Is to head as sock is to? Foot 100.00 3.75 (1.46)
Rock is to hard as pillow is to? Soft 91.40 4.04 (1.88)
Hare is to fast as tortoise is to ? Slow 91.40 5.16 (3.35)
Stand is to ﬂoor as sit is to ? Chair 74.20 9.97 (6.06)
Tooth is to brush as hair is to? Wash 65.70 4.23 (1.87)
Desert is to hot as arctic is to? Cold 80.01 4.07 (1.76)
Eyes is to see as nose is to? Smell 97.14 3.98 (3.53)
Pestle is to mortar as saucer is to? Cup 78.57 7.76 (2.68)
School is to teacher as hospital is to? Doctor 54.28 5.06 (3.42)
Aunt is to uncle as queen is to? King 88.57 6.05 (2.53)
Book is to read as thread is to? Sewing 79.57 4.7 (4.16)
Wardrobe is to clothes as bed is to? Sleep 48.22 4.78 (1.71)
Carrot is to vegetable as apple is to? Fruit 91.43 3.82 (9.05)
Poverty is to wealth as sickness is to? Health 62.85 7.18 (4.54)
Dark is to light as short is to? Long 37.10 5.37 (6.17)
Tunnel is to mountain as bridge is to? River 60.00 7.47 (12.15)
Fire is to hot as candy is to? Sweet 74.29 9.52 (1.19)
Terriﬁed is to scared as mad is to? Anger 30.01 14.49 (18.8)
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due to age (<60 years, and thus not aged matched),
leaving 24 OACs (8 males and 16 females) and 21 early
onset AD (5 males and 16 females) participants. Older
healthy adults gave their written informed consent. For
people with AD, written informed consent was given
either by them or their primary caregivers.
There were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
OAC’s and AD participants on age and years of educa-
tion, but the groups diﬀered on most cognitive tests
(see Table 2).
Design
A 2 (Group: AD or OAC) × 3 (Priming: true memory
prime, false memory prime, or unprimed) mixed
design was employed. Group was a between-
participants factor, and priming of solution was
a within-participant factor. Primed problems were ana-
lyzed for those participants who either correctly
recalled the presented critical lure (true memory prim-
ing) or falsely recalled the critical lure (false memory
priming) or when the solution was unprimed.
Materials and procedure
We followed the same procedure as Howe et al. (2013),
see Figure 1. There were nine DRM lists selected to use in
this experiment selected from Roediger et al. (2001).
Each DRM list consisted of 12 words (e.g., shoe, hand,
toe, walk) and was associated with an unpresented target
or “critical lure” item (e.g., foot). The lists for false
memory primes contained 12 associates of the unpre-
sented critical lure. Lists for true memory primes (words
actually presented) contained 11 of these associates, with
the lowest associate being replaced with the critical lure
to that list in the ﬁrst presentation position (see Howe
et al., 2013). The ﬁrst serial position was chosen for the
critical lure to ensure that this term was “other” – gen-
erated rather than “self”-generated. That is, the proces-
sing of prior related items before presentation of the
critical lure could cause activation of the critical lure
before it was actually presented, a situation that would
lead to it being self-generated rather than other-
generated. By using the ﬁrst serial position in the DRM
list, we ensured that in our true memory priming con-
dition the critical lure was self-generated by the partici-
pant. The ﬁnal item of the list was removed in the true
memory condition in order to ensure that the overall
backward associative strength (BAS; a key factor in
determining the probability of producing false mem-
ories) of the list did not vary greatly between the true
and false memory priming conditions. Associative words
that overlapped with the items presented in the analogi-
cal problems were removed and replaced with another
associate. In this way, DRM list items were not part of
any subsequent analogy items (see Appendix). The
Experiment had 3 stages: study phase, recognition test,
and analogy problem task.
Study phase. Participants were tested individually and
were ﬁrst presented with six of the nine DRM lists in
randomized order. Three of the lists contained the true
memory prime to three of the subsequently presented
analogies (i.e., the ﬁrst presented item in the list was
the critical lure/analogy solution) and three of the lists
did not contain the critical lure to three of the subse-
quently presented analogies (i.e., the critical lure/ana-
logy solution would be the associated but unpresented
critical lure to each of the three lists). Each list was
presented verbally by the experimenter and was fol-
lowed by a brief distractor task (counting backwards by
three’s). Following this, the next list was presented and
this sequence of study-distractor continued until all six
lists were completed.
Recognition test. Once participants had completed all
six DRM lists, they completed a recognition task whereby
participants were verbally presented with the 6 critical
lure words (3 true and 3 false words) from the studied
DRM lists, 6 unstudied and unrelated critical lure words
Table 2. Means (and standard error) demographic characteristics of participants.
Early AD OAC Test Statistic P-value
Age 78.25 (1.46) 78.23 (0.81) 2.85 0.35
Education 13.99 (0.54) 14.01 (0.72) 0.67 0.27
NART 114.22 (1.8) 117.28 (0.94) 2.75 0.15
MMSE (out of 30) 24.64 (2.7) 29.11 (1.07) 18.17 0.001
CERAD
Immediate (out of 30) 11.09 (2.98) 15.44 (4.23) 10.93 0.001
Delayed (out of 10) 3.15 (1.97) 5.19 (2.32) 12.68 0.001
Recognition (out of 10) 7.22 (1.82) 9.59 (0.26) 15.19 0.001
Digit span (out of 10)
FWD 5.4 (1.0) 6.5 (1.91) 8.72 0.001
BCK 3.09 (1.1) 5.5 (1.4) 7.83 0.001
CERAD = Consortium to Establish a Registry for Alzheimer ’s disease; Early AD = early onset Alzheimer’s Disease; OAC = Older
adult controls; MMSE = Mini-Mental State Examination.
** Signiﬁcant p < .001.
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(these were critical lures taken from unrelated and non-
presented DRM lists), 32 list items (these were studied
words from the presented DRM lists), 32 unrelated words
(these were words taken from unrelated and non-
presented DRM lists; unrelated foils), and 6 related but
unpresented items (these were weakly related words that
were from the presented DRM lists but that had not been
presented during study; weakly related foils). All items in
the recognition test were taken from Roediger, Balota
et al. (2001). A recognition test was implemented rather
than a recall test to reduce eﬀects of priming during
retrieval (Olszewska & Ulatowska, 2013). For each word
presented in the recognition task, participants had to
select either [O], indicating that the word was Old and
that they recognize the word from the previously pre-
sented lists, or [N] if they thought the current word
presented was a new word that they did not hear in the
previous word lists.
Analogy problems task. Finally, participants solved
a practice analogical reasoning problem before complet-
ing nine test analogical reasoning problems (using the
same procedure as Experiment 1). Participants were pre-
sented with, in a randomized order, the nine analogical
reasoning problems in the format of “a is to b as c is to ?”
For example, the analogy for the critical lure “foot” was
“hat is to head as sock is to _____.” Participants provided
their answers verbally to the experimenter. The time
taken for them to complete the analogical problem,
from presentation of the analogical problem to produc-
tion of the response was recorded. The experimenter was
blind to which analogies corresponded to which priming
condition participants were in, with the experimenter not
knowing which analogies were primed with a true mem-
ory or which analogies were primed with a false memory.
Similarly, the experimenter was blind to whether partici-
pants recalled the critical lure or not until after comple-
tion of the study. Participants were given a maximum of
60 s to provide an answer. Presentation of the DRM lists
according to their link to the solution type in the
unprimed, true memory prime, and false memory
prime conditions was fully counterbalanced such that
each DRM list and associated analogical problem
appeared equally often across participants within each
group in each solution-type condition. A diagram of the
entire procedure is depicted in Figure 1.
Results
Recognition task
The recognition task showed that both the OACs and
people with AD created false memories for the critical
lure words, with people with AD falsely recognizing the
critical lure 63% (M = 1.91, SD = 0.67) of the time and
the OAC group 61% (M =1.85, SD = .81) of the time.
There were no reliable group diﬀerences (t ns).
Overall recognition scores were analyzed using a 2
(Group: AD vs. OAC) x 4 (list type: critical lures, unstu-
died unrelated critical lures, foils, and list items) mixed
model ANOVA. Analysis revealed a signiﬁcant main
eﬀect of list type, F(1, 44) = 492.19, p < .001. Pairwise
comparisons revealed greater recognition for list items
(78.8%) compared to foil items [correctly identifying
these as “New” items, (70.5%) (M = 25.21, SD = 3.16
Study Phase
Recognition Test
Analogy Solutions
DRM list items
Studied 
items
Unstudied 
CLs
Unprimed Primed
True CL 
Primed
False CL
Unrelated
Unpresented 
Words
“Studied” 
CLs
Related
Unpresented 
Words
Figure 1. Diagram of the procedure for Experiment 2 (CL = critical lures).
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vsM = 22.58, SD = 6.115)] and greater recognition of CL
words (73.6%) compared to unrelated CL words (44.5%)
(M = 4.42, SD = 1.18 vsM = 2.67, SD = 1.22). There was
a main eﬀect of group F(1, 44) = 18.76, p < .001. To
investigate this further we ran separate t-tests on list
types; for list items, the OAC group recognized signiﬁ-
cantly more items (M = 26.61, SD = 2.27) than people
with AD (M = 23.6, SD = 3.31) t (44) = 3.5, p < .001.
Concerning Foil items again the OAC group recognized
signiﬁcantly more items (M = 24.48, SD = 6.62) than
people with AD (M = 20.4, SD = 4.74), t (44) = 2.28, p <
.05. There were no reliable group diﬀerences for critical
lures and unrelated critical lures t (44) = 1.18, P > 0.05.
Signal detection measures
Because false alarm rates for recognition tests often require
a correction for response bias, we analyzed discrimination
and response bias scores using signal detection analysis.
We used the Snodgrass and Corwin (1988) correction for
signal theory (SDT), whereby 0.5 was added to hit and false
alarm rates and the corrected score was divided by N + 1.
This was used in order to prevent values of 1.0 and 0. For
discriminability (d’), larger values indicate better memory
performance, and for criterion value C, values greater than
0 represent a conservative bias and less than 0 represents
a liberal bias. The calculation of d’ and C for critical lures
and hits used the common false alarm rate for unrelated
critical lure.
The values of d’ and C are shown in Table 3. Signal
detection measures for hits and critical lures were analyzed
in separate 2 (Group: AD vs OAC) × 2 (list type: critical
lures vs studied items) mixed-model ANOVA. The analy-
sis of d’ revealed a main eﬀect of list type, where by
discriminability was better for critical lures compared to
list items, F(1, 44) = 46.67, p < .001, η2p = .17. There was no
main eﬀect of group and no interaction (p ns).
Analysis of the criterion C revealed a more liberal bias
for the critical lures F(1, 44) = 8.301, p < .001, η2p = .53
compared to studied items. There was a main eﬀect of
group F(1, 44) = 26.53, p < .001, η2p = .39 whereby people
with AD revealed a more liberal bias compared to OACs.
There was no signiﬁcant interaction.
The mean analogy solution rates (proportions)
and the mean analogy solution times (in seconds)
were calculated for each participant and analyzed
separately in a series of 2 (Group: OAC vs. AD) ×
5 (Priming: primed/FM vs. primed/no-FM vs.
primed/TM vs. primed/no-TM vs. unprimed)
ANOVAs. Note that these problem solving data are
conditionalized on memory performance. That is,
primed/FM refers to analogy problems that were
solved correctly only when the related false memory
was recognized on the memory test and primed/no-
FM refers to problems solved when the DRM list was
presented but the participant did not falsely remem-
ber the critical lure on the recognition test. Primed/
TM refers to analogy problems that were solved
correctly only when the true memory was recognized
on the memory test and primed/no-TM refers to
problems solved when the DRM list was presented
but the participant did not remember the actually
presented critical lure on the recognition test. Of
course, unprimed refers to analogy problems that
were solved correctly when no DRM priming list
was presented.
Analogy solution rates
Concerning solution rates, there was a main eﬀect
for priming, F(4, 44) = 48.02, p < .001, η2p = .32,
where post-hoc tests (Tukey’s HSD) showed that
solution rates were higher for primed/FM analogical
problems (M = 2.83) than for primed/no-FM (M =
1.96, p = <.01), primed/TM (M = 1.93, p = < .01),
primed/no-TM (M = 1.83, p = < .01) and when
participants were unprimed (M = 1.90, p = < .01),
with the latter 4 conditions not diﬀering. As
expected, there was a main eﬀect of group, F(1, 44)
= 8.16, p < .001, η2p = .24, where post-hoc tests
(Tukey’s HSD) showed the OACs solved reliably
more problems compared to people with AD (see
Table 4). There was no signiﬁcant interaction.
Analogy solution times
As anticipated, there were signiﬁcant diﬀerences in solu-
tion times as a function of group and priming. Speciﬁcally
there was a main eﬀect for priming, F(4, 44) = 103.28, p <
.001, η2p = .544, where post-hoc tests (Tukey’s HSD)
showed that solution times were faster for primed/FM
problems (M = 3.52 sec) compared to primed/No-FM
problems (M = 5.49, p < .01), primed/TM problems (M =
5.33 sec, p < .01), primed/no-TM problems (M = 5.56 sec,
p < .01), and unprimed analogical problems (M = 5.59 sec,
p = < .01), with the latter 4 conditions not diﬀering. There
was a main eﬀect of group, F(1, 44) = 79.51, p < .001, η2p =
.694, where post-hoc tests (Tukey’s HSD) showed OAC’s
solution times were faster (M = 4.01 sec) compared to
people with AD (M = 5.77 sec, p < .01) (see Table 4). The
interaction was not signiﬁcant.
Table 3. Means and standard deviations of signal detection
measures of discriminability (d’) and bias (C) for studied items
and critical lures (CL).
OACs AD
d‘ C d‘ C
Studied 0.7 (0.48) 0.93 (0.41) 0.28 (0.6) 0.5 (0.19)
Lures 0.96 (0.54) 0.29 (0.23) 1.03 (0.11) 0.17 (23.4)
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General discussion
The present study set out to extend the positive conse-
quences of false memories using verbal proportional ana-
logies, in healthy older adults and people with
Alzheimer’s disease. Although this eﬀect has been
shown in CRAT problems in OACs and people
with AD (Akhtar et al., in press), it is not clear whether
such eﬀects extend to problem-solving tasks that are
more complex. Nor is it clear whether false memories
serve as better primes for problem solving than true
memories. To investigate these issues, participants were
asked to solve verbal proportional analogies, three of
which had been primed by a true memory, three of
which were primed by a false memory, and three of
which were unprimed. Our ﬁndings provide a unique
and important demonstration that false memories are
more eﬀective at priming solutions to analogical pro-
blems than true memories for OACs and people with AD.
An important aim of the current study was to
ascertain whether both true and false memory prim-
ing could facilitate speed and accuracy of analogical
reasoning for both OACs and people with AD. In
order to examine this, we needed to show that parti-
cipants form false memories for DRM lists and that
they can remember items that were actually presented.
Consistent with previous research, our study showed
no reliable diﬀerences in the number of false mem-
ories produced in the recognition task for OACs and
people with AD (Akhtar et al., in press; Roediger,
Balota et al., 2001; Waldie & Kwong See, 2003). This
ﬁnding can be explained by the fact that both older
healthy adults and those with AD show intact seman-
tic networks that automatically activate CLs upon
DRM list presentation (Akhtar et al., in press;
Evrard et al., 2015; Gilet et al.,2016). Both older
healthy adults and those with AD have intact semantic
networks that automatically activate CLs upon DRM
list presentation. Our ﬁndings support existing evi-
dence regarding the underlying mechanisms in the
production of false memories (Evrard et al., 2015;
Gilet et al., 2016; Roediger, Balota et al., 2001).
Previous research has shown the generation of false
memories from the automatic spread of activation within
the semantic networks and the corresponding activations
of word associations. The ﬁndings from the present study
further extend this notion, providing evidence that not
only are false memories associated with the spreading
activation among semantic associates but that they can
exert a positive eﬀect when it comes to priming subse-
quent task performance . Importantly, when
a recognition test is administered in this priming para-
digm, endorsement of the false memory item vs. no
endorsement is an index of the strength of activation of
the critical lure inmemory. That is, no recognitionmeans
that activation is below threshold whereas recognition
indicates that this activation is above threshold.
Although false memories arise at encoding, test perfor-
mance reveals the strength of that activation. It also turns
out that presenting the critical lure at test has little or no
eﬀect on memory strength of the critical lure because, as
already mentioned, false memories arise during the
encoding, not retrieval, processing (see Howe et al., 2016).
It is important to acknowledge, that despite these
ﬁndings, there exists a large clinical literature showing
that there are important semantic deﬁcits associated
with Alzheimer’s disease and people with MCI (e.g.,
Hodges, Salmon, & Butters, 1992; Howard & Patterson,
1992). However, despite these deﬁcits, Nebes (1989)
and Evard et al. (Evrard et al., 2015) have shown that
semantic priming in Alzheimer’s disease has remained
relatively intact. Thus, like these latter priming results,
our experiments show that when it comes to tasks in
which simple, semantic associative processes are
engaged automatically, the results of these processes
can be used to facilitate subsequent problem solving.
Just like in Akhtar et al. (in press) and Howe et al.
(2011), we found that when problem solutions were
primed by the prior presentation of DRM lists whose
critical lures were falsely remembered and were solu-
tions to those problems, both the probability of such
problems being solved and the speed with which they
were solved improved signiﬁcantly for both OACs and
people with AD. Thus, DRM lists can prime and
Table 4. Mean analogical problem solution rates and solution times for older adults, Early Alzheimer’s patients for false memory
priming.
Priming
Participant Unprimed Primed/TM Primed/no-TM Primed/FM Primed/no-FM
Solution times (seconds)
OAC 4.66 (1.92) 4.55 (1.27) 4.65 (0.59) 2.77 (1.65) 4.7 (0.8)
AD 6.65 (1.57) 6.22 (1.22) 6.47 (1.09) 4.3 (1.74) 6.51 (1.08)
Solution rates (proportions)
OAC 0.73 (0.58) 0.71 (0.79) 0.7 (0.83) 1 (.0) 0.69 (0.69)
AD 0.53 (0.45) 0.56 (0.73) 0.56 (0.65) 0.79 (.31) 0.55 (0.74)
Standard errors are in parenthesis. FM = False Memory
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facilitate performance on problem-solving tasks both
in terms of the rate and the speed which they are
solved. Such facilitation was not found when the CL
(false memory) was not remembered. Moreover,
priming with true memories resulted in problem-
solving rates and times identical to conditions in
which there was no priming. This further strengthens
the notion that false memories are superior primes to
true memories and can successfully prime higher cog-
nitive processes (analogical reasoning). Overall then,
false memories can have very positive eﬀects on sub-
sequent cognitive tasks at least in terms of problems
involving proportional analogies and insight-based
solutions, across the lifespan and with people who
have AD (Akhtar et al., in press; Diliberto-Macaluso,
2005; Howe et al., 2011, 2010, 2016).
To summarize, regardless of cognitive abilities,
speed and solution rates of problem solving were
aﬀected by priming – speciﬁcally false memory
primes. Despite people with AD being slower than
the OACs to solve problems (main eﬀect of group),
solution rates were reliably higher and solution times
were reliably quicker, and by the same magnitude,
for both groups for problems that were primed by
false memories. No advantage was obtained for
priming true memories. This ﬁnding has implications
not only for priming work but also for the debate
surrounding the diﬀerences between, and similarities
of, true and false memories (e.g., Diliberto-Macaluso,
2005; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). In terms of
priming higher-order reasoning tasks, there appears
to be a clear distinction between true and false
remembering. Importantly, this provides further evi-
dence for the beneﬁcial eﬀects of false memories in
a problem-solving domain.
The fact that only false memory primes were eﬀec-
tive in speeding up analogical problem solving has been
documented in children and young adults (Howe et al.,
2013). One explanation for this advantage relates to the
literature concerning the superiority of self-generated
information (e.g., spontaneous false memories) over
other-generated information (e.g., experimenter pre-
sented true memories) that is seen more generally in
memory (e.g., Howe et al., 2013). Self-generated infor-
mation is better retained than other-generated infor-
mation in both groups in the present study and has
been well documented in young adults (e.g., Howe
et al., 2013; Mulligan & Lozito, 2004) and children
(Howe et al., 2013). If critical lures from DRM lists
are not explicitly presented as part of the list (as they
were in the true memory condition), then when they
are falsely remembered, they can be considered to be
self-generated information. In contrast to conditions
where information is already on the list, or other-
generated information, this self-generated information
tends to be stronger and more durable in memory.
Howe et al. (2013) proposed that false memories are
stronger than true memories just like self-generated
memories may be expected to have a greater eﬀect on
the speed of problem solving over true or other-
generated memories when used as 2This explanation
has considerable currency in the child development
literature and given the current results, may hold
across the lifespan and for people with AD. Indeed, it
would seem that one could propose that the mnemonic
beneﬁts of self-referencing and self-generation that are
seen in children (e.g., Cunningham, Brebner, Quinn, &
Turk, 2014), young adults (e.g., Mulligan & Lozito,
2004), older adults, and should also extend to older
adults with AD (at least in the early stages). In fact,
there are some data indicating that self-referencing can
play an important role in memory for healthy older
adults and those with AD (Klein, Cosmides, &
Costabile, 2003; Rosa, Deason, Budson, & Gutchess,
2015). This is probably not too surprising inasmuch
as some theorists (e.g., Humphreys & Sui, 2016; Sui &
Humphreys, 2015) view the self as the very “glue” that
binds encoded elements together to create strong and
durable traces, ones that are particularly well remem-
bered, and that can be used to beneﬁt other perceptual
and cognitive processes. Although additional research
on the role of the self in memory with aging popula-
tions is surely needed, this idea serves these current
data well and knits together our ﬁndings with those
from the child and young adult literatures.
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Appendix: Analogies and DRM lists for
Experiment 2
Water:Boat::Road:Car
Car – truck, bus, train, vehicle, drive, jeep, ford, race, keys,
garage, highway, van
Stand:Floor::Sit:Chair
Chair – table, legs, seat, couch, desk, recliner, sofa, wood,
cushion, swivel, stool, sitting
Tooth:Brush::Hair:Wash
Wash – rinse, dishes, mouth, scrub, laundry, soap, shampoo,
dish, soak, cloth, bathroom
Desert:Hot::Arctic:Cold
Cold – snow, warm, winter, ice, wet, frigid, chilly, heat,
weather, freeze, air, shiver
Poverty:Wealth::Sickness:Health
Health – sickness, good, happiness, ill, service, strong, dis-
ease, body, poorly, pain, vigor, robust
Tunnel:Mountain::Bridge:River
River – water, stream, lake, Mississippi, boat, tide, swim,
ﬂow, run, barrage, creek, brook
Fire:Hot::Candy:Sweet
Sweet – sour, sugar, bitter, good, taste, tooth, nice, honey,
soda, chocolate, heart, cake
Dark:Light::Short:Long
Long – tall, narrow, John, time, far, hair, island, road, thin,
underwear, distance, line
Pestle:Mortar::Saucer:Cup
Cup – mug, tea, measuring, coaster, lid, handle, coﬀee, straw,
goblet, soup, stein, drink
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